With the resolution of MPS risks and the transition of its presidency, Everbright Securities stands at a fresh starting point.

Yet the most valuable aspect of this moment is not about "who will become the next president" — a question that prospectuses and announcements will answer within the next two to three months. What truly deserves scrutiny is this: after shedding the burden carried for nearly a decade, how far is this veteran state-owned brokerage from earning the label of a "first-tier investment bank"?

There is currently no definitive answer, as the outcome hinges on three evolving variables: the selection of a new president, the genuine reinforcement of risk control and compliance, and whether the investment banking business can reverse its multi-year contraction. This article breaks these variables down, outlining the trigger conditions and probabilities for each path, so you can build a tracking framework for your own assessment.

How Will the First Card Be Played in Selecting the New President?

Liu Qiuming officially stepped down on September 18 due to the expiration of his term, and Everbright Securities initiated the selection process for a new president on the same day, though no candidate was announced as of the filing date. Under the rules that took effect in August 2026 by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, senior management appointments at brokerages must undergo nomination review, appointment resolutions, materials submission, and regulatory vetting; industry-wide, the public process for market-based hiring of president-level executives typically takes two to three months. This means the new president could be finalized within 2026, and the choice will directly shape the company's strategic direction over the coming years.

The core constraint here is not the widely discussed "AI initiatives" or "international expansion" — those are tools, not objectives. The key decision-maker is China Everbright Group, which directly or indirectly holds over 45% of Everbright Securities and holds the primary nomination right for the president. The Group has already anchored its strategy on "building a China-first-class service-oriented investment bank," requiring the new president to focus on the "five major articles" of finance and deeply integrate into the Group's full-license synergy system.

In other words, the profile of the new president is already clear: someone who understands compliance, can carry out the Group's strategy, and has a track record in serving the real economy — unlikely to be an aggressive expansionist operator.

MPS Risks Are Fully Resolved, but the Compliance "Tightening" Persists

For ordinary readers, the acronym MPS may be unfamiliar, but it is the key to understanding a decade of turbulence at Everbright Securities. In 2016, Everbright Capital, a subsidiary of Everbright Securities, partnered with Baofeng Group to acquire a 65% stake in British sports copyright company MPS for approximately 5.2 billion yuan. Just two years after the acquisition, MPS went into bankruptcy liquidation, triggering years of massive provisions, bank litigation, and regulatory accountability.

This saga dragged on for nearly a decade until April 2026, when the UK High Court dismissed a $661 million fraud lawsuit filed by Cayman-based Jinxin against MPS's original sellers, bringing all overseas legal proceedings to a close; by the end of 2025, domestic-related litigation settlements had been finalized, leaving only 499 million yuan in estimated liabilities, with no significant impact on the company's operations.

However, with old debts cleared, regulators have not loosened their grip. In May 2026, the Shanghai Securities Regulatory Bureau issued a warning letter to Everbright Securities for failing to follow collective deliberation procedures on overseas subsidiary proposals, the compliance officer not providing written review opinions, and ineffective measures to prevent conflicts of interest between research reports and other business operations.

This suggests a widely held assumption is invalid — resolving MPS risks does not equate to a "relaxation." Any future high-risk innovative business will have minimal room for trial and error. The new president must possess strong risk-control credentials, or they will fail the first hurdle.

Where Exactly Is the Gap to "First-Tier"?

This is the focal point for the opposition's arguments, and we must confront the data head-on. Looking at performance: in 2025, Everbright Securities posted revenue of 10.852 billion yuan and net profit attributable to shareholders of 3.724 billion yuan, up 13% and 22% year-on-year respectively — yet the industry average growth was 19.95% and 31.20%, meaning the company underperformed both metrics. More critically, the gap with peers is widening: in the same year, CITIC Securities' net profit grew 38.58% and CICC's grew 71.93%, while Everbright Securities' industry ranking in net profit slipped from 11th place in 2023 to 13th in 2025.

On the structural front: in the first half of 2026, wealth management income accounted for 57% of total revenue, serving as the absolute pillar, while investment banking contributed only 5%. Equity investment recorded a loss of 219 million yuan, making it the only business segment with negative revenue. During this period, equity financing completed only a small number of NEEQ private placements and listings, with virtually no new core IPO sponsorship projects landing; both Everbright Capital and Everbright Development, the two direct investment subsidiaries, were loss-making in the first half.

Taking a longer view makes it clearer: in 2020, Everbright Securities' net investment banking fee income stood at 1.987 billion yuan, but by 2025 it had fallen to 775 million yuan — halved in five years. In 2025, a year of sector-wide boom in equity financing, its investment banking income actually declined 5.81% year-on-year, diverging sharply from the 40%+ growth seen at top-tier brokerages. This is the most worrying sign: while the industry surges ahead, you fall behind; and when the market retreats, catching up becomes even harder. Before 2027, leading brokerages will further expand their capital through mergers and acquisitions, and the scale gap between Everbright Securities and the first tier could continue to widen.

What Signposts Will Determine the Direction Going Forward?

Let's return to the question posed at the start — "how far?" — It is not an answer that can be measured precisely in miles, but it can be broken down into clear tracking indicators.

Path A (genuine progress toward the "first-tier" goal) is triggered by: the new president taking office on time with solid risk-control and compliance credentials, investment banking reserve projects beginning to convert into actual revenue within a year of appointment, net investment banking fee income stabilizing and rising above 1 billion yuan, narrowing or reversing losses in the equity investment segment, and no further decline in net profit industry ranking. Based on available data, in the first half of 2026, Everbright Securities added 6 new IPO project acceptances and had 12 under review, ranking 14th and 13th in the industry respectively; bond underwriting reached 138.497 billion yuan with a 2.32% market share, and asset-backed securities underwriting ranked 9th industry-wide — these reserves are cards the new team can play, but their conversion into revenue depends on the new president's operational acumen and market windows.

Path B (further widening of the gap) also has clear triggers: if over the next two full fiscal years, net investment banking fee income remains below 1.5 billion yuan, market share stays under 1%, and the company fails to enter the industry's top 20; if another regulatory warning letter is issued between 2026-2027 due to overseas subsidiary controls or investment banking compliance issues; or if wealth management income consistently exceeds 55% of total revenue with equity investment losses for two consecutive years — then the assessment that "the gap is narrowing" must be deemed refuted.

Currently, the probability of Path A is slightly higher, but its preconditions are demanding: the new president must be appointed on schedule with unimpeachable compliance credentials, and the investment banking business must meaningfully recover within two years. If the selection is delayed or the candidate lacks sufficient risk-control background, the likelihood of Path B will rise sharply.

For readers tracking this story, the most important takeaway is not any single judgment in this article, but rather the signposts ahead: the announcement of the new president (expected before the end of 2026), the investment banking income and net profit industry ranking in the 2026 annual report, and whether another regulatory penalty appears — these three developments will provide the clearest answer within a year.